UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26518
1 October 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),

Reaffirming also its resolution 713 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 20 September 1993 (S/26470 and Add.1),

Having also considered the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia dated 24 September 1993 (S/26491, annex),

Deeply concerned that the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia (S/23280, annex III), and all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 769 (1992), have not yet been fully implemented,

Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 20 September 1993 (S/26470), in particular its paragraph 16;

2. Takes note of the intention of the Secretary-General to establish, as described in his report, three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR - UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) - while retaining the existing dispositions in all other respects for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia;

3. Condemns once again continuing military attacks within the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where UNPROFOR is deployed;

4. Reaffirms the crucial importance of the full and prompt implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia including the provisions of the plan concerning the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and calls upon the signatories of that plan and all others concerned, in particular the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full implementation;

5. Declares that continued non-cooperation in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council or external interference, in respect of the full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia would have serious consequences and in this connection affirms that full normalization of the international community's position towards those concerned will take into account their actions in implementing all relevant resolutions of the Security Council including those relating to the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia;

6. Calls for an immediate cease-fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs, mediated under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and urges them to cooperate fully and unconditionally in its implementation, as well as in the implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the Council;

7. Stresses the importance it attaches, as a first step towards the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, to the process of restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the "pink zones", and in this context calls for the revival of the Joint Commission established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR;

8. Urges all the parties and others concerned to cooperate with UNPROFOR in reaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures including the restoration of electricity, water and communications in all regions of the Republic of Croatia, and stresses in this context the importance it attaches to the opening of the railroad between Zagreb and Split, the highway between Zagreb and Zupanja, and the Adriatic oil pipeline, securing the uninterrupted traffic across the Maslenica strait, and restoring the supply of electricity and water to all regions of the Republic of Croatia including the United Nations Protected Areas;

9. Authorizes UNPROFOR, in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom of movement;

10. Decides to continue to review urgently the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR in the territory of the Republic of Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 20 September 1993 (S/26470);

11. Decides in this context to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional period terminating on 31 March 1994;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to report two months after the adoption of the present resolution on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the negotiations within the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider UNPROFOR'S mandate in the light of that report;

13. Requests further the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on developments in regard to the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26519
5 October 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993,

Reaffirming also its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 24 September 1993 (S/26488 and Add.1),

Welcoming the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement (including its Protocols) on 4 August 1993 and urging the parties to continue to comply fully with it,

Noting the conclusion of the Secretary-General that in order to enable the United Nations to carry out its mandate successfully and effectively, the full cooperation of the parties with one another and with the Organization is required,

Stressing the urgency of the deployment of an international neutral force in Rwanda, as underlined both by the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and by the Rwandese Patriotic Front and as reaffirmed by their joint delegation in New York,

Paying tribute to the role played by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in the conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Resolved that the United Nations should, at the request of the parties and under peaceful conditions with the full cooperation of all the parties, make its full contribution to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26488);

2. Decides to establish a peace-keeping operation under the name "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (UNAMIR) for a period of six months subject to the proviso that it will be extended beyond the initial

ninety days only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

3. Decides that, drawing from the Secretary-General's recommendations, UNAMIR shall have the following mandate:

(a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city;

(b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures;

(c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;

(d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;

(e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;

(f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;

(g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations;

(h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police;

4. Approves the Secretary-General's proposal that the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) established by resolution 846 (1993) should be integrated within UNAMIR;

5. Welcomes the efforts and the cooperation of the OAU in helping to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement, in particular the integration of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) within UNAMIR;

6. Further approves the Secretary-General's proposal that the deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR should be carried out in stages and notes in this connection that UNAMIR's mandate, if extended, is expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, events which are scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995;

7. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in this context, to deploy the first contingent, at the level specified by the Secretary-General's report, to Kigali for an initial period of six months, in the shortest possible time, which, when

fully in place, will permit the establishment of the transitional institutions and implementation of the other relevant provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

8. Invites the Secretary-General, in the context of the report referred to in paragraph 2 above, also to report on the progress of UNAMIR following its initial deployment, and resolves to review as appropriate, on the basis of that report and as part of the review referred to in paragraph 2 above, the requirement for further deployments in the scale and composition recommended by the Secretary-General in his report (S/26488);

9. Invites the Secretary-General to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR, in particular through phased deployment without thereby affecting the capacity of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate, and requests the Secretary-General in planning and executing the phased deployment of UNAMIR to seek economies and to report regularly on what is achieved in this regard;

10. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements;

11. Urges the parties to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement in good faith;

12. Also requests the Secretary-General to conclude expeditiously an agreement on the status of the operation, and all personnel engaged in the operation in Rwanda, to come into force as near as possible to the outset of the operation and no later than thirty days after the adoption of this resolution;

13. Demands that the parties take all appropriate steps to ensure the security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged in the operation;

14. Urges Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide and intensify their economic, financial and humanitarian assistance in favour of the Rwandese population and of the democratization process in Rwanda;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26520
1 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

(for the period 1 April-30 September 1993)

INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 5 of its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council established a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the Iraq-Kuwait boundary and decided to set up an observer unit with the following tasks: to monitor the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and the DMZ; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the DMZ; and to observe any potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State into the other. By its resolution 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991, the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the above provisions (S/22454); noted that the decision to set up the observer unit had been taken in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) and could be terminated only by a decision of the Council; and decided to review the question of termination or continuation as well as the modalities of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) every six months. The Security Council last reviewed this matter on 7 April 1993 and concurred with my recommendation (S/25514, para. 32) that UNIKOM be maintained for a further six-month period (S/25588). The purpose of the present report is to provide the Security Council, prior to its forthcoming review, with an overview of UNIKOM's activities during the last six months.

I. ORGANIZATION

2. As of September 1993, the composition of UNIKOM was as follows:

Military observers

Argentina	6
Austria	7
Bangladesh	6
Canada	5
China	15
Denmark	6
Fiji	6
Finland	7
France	15
Guyana	6
Greece	6
Hungary	6
India	6
Indonesia	6
Ireland	6
Italy	7
Kenya	6
Malaysia	6
Nigeria	6
Norway	8
Pakistan	7
Poland	7
Romania	6
Russian Federation	15
Senegal	6
Singapore	6
Sweden	7
Thailand	6
Turkey	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	15
Uruguay	6
United States of America	15
Venezuela	7
Total	252 a/

Administrative and logistic units

Engineers (Argentina)	50	
Logistics (Denmark)	45	
Medical (Norway)	20	
Total		115
Total military personnel		367

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a/ The authorized strength of the military observers is 300, of whom 48 are on stand-by in their countries. Four military observers have been temporarily detached to assist the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia.

UNIKOM also has 185 civilian staff, of whom 79 are recruited internationally and 106 locally.

3. Major-General T. K. Dibuama (Ghana) continued as Chief Military Observer until 20 August 1993. Since then, the UNIKOM Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Vigar Aabrek (Norway), has been Acting Chief Military Observer. I shall revert to the Security Council concerning the appointment of the new Chief Military Observer.

4. UNIKOM has two small fixed-wing civilian aircraft contributed by the Government of Switzerland at no cost to the Organization and three chartered helicopters. It also has the use of a chartered aircraft for the transport of personnel and equipment between Baghdad and Kuwait.

5. As already reported (S/25514, para. 4), the Canadian engineers were replaced by an Argentinian unit, which reached its full strength in mid-September. The unit arrived without much of the equipment it requires, as it was deemed to be more economical to arrange for the supply of the equipment in the area. Efforts continue to achieve this.

6. The Danish logistic unit continued to carry out vehicle maintenance, supply and security tasks, the latter mainly for the headquarters facilities at Umm Qasr and Camp Khor and for the logistic base at Doha.

7. The Norwegian medical unit continued to provide a sick-bay facility in Umm Qasr, serving the headquarters and the northern sector, and first aid posts at the central and southern sector headquarters. The unit also provided emergency assistance to civilians injured in the DMZ. The Government of Norway has informed me that it intends to withdraw the unit at the end of October. I have approached a number of States for a replacement, so far without result.

8. Concerning the reinforcement of UNIKOM in pursuance of Security Council resolution 806 (1993) of 5 February 1993, it has not been possible, despite strenuous efforts, to identify a Member State which is in a position to provide a suitably equipped mechanized infantry battalion. However, one Member State has offered to provide an infantry battalion if the United Nations would provide

the armoured vehicles, heavy transport and other equipment. Such equipment would normally be integral to the battalion and there is no provision for its purchase in the budget. I am in touch with a Government which has indicated that it would be willing to provide the equipment for the battalion. The Government of Kuwait has also agreed to build the two camps in which the unit is to be accommodated and to make them available to UNIKOM at no charge.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

9. UNIKOM remained deployed in the DMZ as outlined in previous reports (see attached map). For operational purposes it has divided the DMZ into three sectors. Its concept of operations is based on a combination of patrol/observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrols, investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels. UNIKOM employs surveillance aids, which include maritime radar for the Khawr Abd Allah, night vision devices, high-powered binoculars and video cameras. In addition, UNIKOM uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) for the accurate determination of locations in the terrain.

10. In a letter dated 12 May 1993, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait informed me of his Government's decision to establish a border security system, comprising a trench, an earthen embankment and a patrol road, along the entire length of the land portion of the demarcated boundary between Kuwait and Iraq. This project commenced on 12 June, and at the time of reporting the work was nearly completed in the southern and central sectors. Four crossing points have been constructed for use by UNIKOM, one in each sector and an additional one on the main road at Safwan. UNIKOM will review this arrangement from time to time in the light of its operational requirements.

11. UNIKOM has liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City, and the Chief Military Observer and other senior staff of UNIKOM have maintained regular contacts with the authorities in both capitals. At the local level, liaison continued with the police on both sides, which has been useful in dealing with violations and complaints. Following the recent establishment of a Kuwaiti office in the DMZ, both sides now have liaison facilities within easy reach of UNIKOM's headquarters. The Iraqi authorities have also established liaison offices at the sector level.

III. SITUATION IN THE DMZ

12. During the period under review, the situation in the DMZ was calm.

13. UNIKOM observed three types of violations of the DMZ; minor incursions by military personnel on the ground; overflights by military aircrafts; and violations involving the carrying and firing of weapons other than sidearms, the majority of which were committed by policemen. The following table summarizes the violations observed by UNIKOM.

	Iraq				Kuwait			
	Ground	Air	Weapon	Total	Ground	Air	Weapon	Total
April	3	0	0	3	0	0	7	7
May	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	4
June	2	0	0	2	2	0	10	12
July	0	0	1	1	0	0	9	9
August	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	2
September	2	0	2	4	2	0	1	3
Total	8	0	4	12	6	0	31	37

	Member States cooperating with Kuwait				Unidentified			
	Ground	Air	Weapon	Total	Ground	Air	Weapon	Total
April	2	1	0	3	0	7	0	7
May	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	3
June	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
July	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
August	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
September	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	3	1	0	4	0	18	0	18

14. During the reporting period, UNIKOM received eight written complaints from Iraq and none from Kuwait. UNIKOM investigated each complaint and conveyed its findings to the Iraqi authorities. These complaints were about firing at police posts close to the boundary and violations of air space.

15. Much of the DMZ is still littered with unexploded ordnance and debris left over from the war, in particular on the Iraqi side of the border. Private companies under contract to the Government of Kuwait have continued clearing operations on the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and are currently working in areas along the boundary. The Iraqi authorities also continued to employ civilian work teams inside the DMZ for clearing unexploded ordnance and retrieving equipment damaged during the war. UNIKOM has been kept informed of these activities and monitored them closely.

16. It will be recalled that I have offered my assistance to the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait in the settlement of issues involving Iraqi citizens and their assets found to be on Kuwaiti territory following the demarcation of the boundary. The Government of Kuwait has indicated that it would not be possible for these Iraqi citizens to remain in Kuwait and has offered to pay compensation for their private property and assets. It has requested that the assessment be carried out by a neutral party designated by the United Nations. The Government of Iraq, while rejecting the principle of relocation and compensation, stated that it would take no action that might provoke dispute or contention with the United Nations. I have, in the meantime, selected an experienced land assessor

who is in the process of valuing the private Iraqi farms in the Safwan area and the private Iraqi assets at Umm Qasr. On the basis of his assessment and after consultations with the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait, I intend to determine the amount of compensation. I am also ready to assist with the process of compensation. I have appealed to the parties to exercise maximum restraint and to cooperate in the search for a peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues.

17. UNIKOM continued to provide technical support to other United Nations missions in Iraq and Kuwait. In particular, it assisted the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and the United Nations Coordinator for the Return of Property from Iraq to Kuwait. UNIKOM continued to provide movement control in respect of all United Nations aircraft operating in the area.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

18. By its resolution 47/208 B of 14 September 1993, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments for UNIKOM at a rate not to exceed $6,250,825 gross ($6,064,700 net) per month for the four-month period from 1 November 1993 to 28 February 1994. This authorization is subject to the Security Council's review of the mandate of the Mission and to the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

19. Should the Security Council continue the mandate of UNIKOM beyond 9 October 1993, the monthly cost of maintaining the Mission will be limited to the commitment authority contained in General Assembly resolution 47/208 B. I shall report to the Advisory Committee and to the General Assembly on the additional requirements needed, if any, for the maintenance of the Mission. In this regard, by letter dated 17 July 1993 and addressed to me, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait conveyed his Government's decision to defray two thirds of the cost of UNIKOM.

20. Unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIKOM Special Account for the period since the inception of the Mission through 31 August 1993 amounted to $26.5 million.

V. OBSERVATIONS

21. During the last six months, the UNIKOM area of operations has been calm. Through close monitoring of the area and constant liaison with the Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities, UNIKOM has played its part in preventing incidents and redressing the minor violations that have occurred. In discharging its responsibilities, UNIKOM has received the cooperation of both sides.

22. The present calm along the Iraq-Kuwait border should not obscure the fact that tensions persist and full peace has yet to be restored to the area. In the circumstances, the presence of UNIKOM remains an important factor of stability along the Iraq-Kuwait border. I therefore recommend that the Mission be maintained for a further six-month period.

23. I regret that it has not been possible to make more progress on the strengthening of UNIKOM. This is the reflection of a recent trend whereby contributions to new United Nations peace-keeping operations are increasingly at the expense of the existing ones, especially those where the situation is reasonably calm. In addition, certain specialized units have become very hard to find and I am having difficulty obtaining a replacement for the Norwegian medical unit. I shall, of course, continue my efforts to overcome these difficulties.

24. In this connection, I note with appreciation the decision of the Government of Kuwait to defray the cost of two thirds of the UNIKOM budget. This will considerably ease the burden on Member States of maintaining the Mission.

25. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to the Chief Military Observer and to the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.



MAP NO. 3637 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
OCTOBER 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/26521
1 October 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, the French and English texts of the statement on Liberia issued by the European Community and its member States on 29 September 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement issued on 29 September 1993 on Liberia

The Community and its member States welcome the agreement concluded at Cotonou on 25 July 1993 between the Liberian parties during the summit of heads of State and government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Community and its member States support the efforts made in this connection by the United Nations Organization and the Organization of African Unity.

The Community and its member States encourage all the Liberian parties to apply the Cotonou agreement in good faith and take part, in accordance with the conditions laid down, in the provisional institutions responsible for administering the country before the elections. They take note of the decision to extend the participation in the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to other African States and express their hope that such decisions will be implemented swiftly.

The Community and its member States are pleased to note the inclusion of humanitarian aid in the process of a return to peace. They welcome the fact that the principles relating to this in the Cotonou agreement are being implemented and would urge that adequate arrangements be made to allow aid to reach all Liberians in all regions of the country by the most direct routes.

Finally, the Community and its member States confirm that they are prepared to consider when the time comes what assistance they will be able to provide in the context of the process of a return to peace in Liberia.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26522
1 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a letter dated 1 October 1993 addressed to you by the Hon. Mario Raffaelli, Chairman of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Conference on Nagorny Karabakh, on the present state of the efforts made by the Minsk Group for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.

I should appreciate it if the letter, and the enclosed "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)", could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Francesco Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

Annex

Letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 13 of Security Council resolution 853 (1993), I wish to report on the present state of the efforts made by the Minsk Group for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict.

The Minsk Group held unofficial consultations in Moscow from 9 to 11 September and again in Paris from 22 to 28 September. At the same time, direct contacts between the parties to the conflict were carried out in Moscow on 12 and 13 September, and again in the days around 24 September, on the fringes of a meeting of Commonwealth of Independent States leaders that took place there on that day.

These direct contacts resulted in the cease-fire in force from 31 August being extended to 5 October; further extensions are being discussed at the present time.

The Moscow and Paris Minsk Group consultations took into account the result of the direct contacts, as well as other elements and positions put forward by the parties. The result was an "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)" dated 28 September 1993, which is attached.

This timetable is now being sent to the parties, with the request that they signify their acceptance of it by 7 October at 12 noon, local time.

As in previous cases, the timetable provides for the withdrawal from occupied territories, the restoration of communications and transportation, the transformation of the present cease-fire into a permanent cessation of all military activities, under the supervision of a CSCE monitoring mission, and the opening of the Minsk Conference, which is foreseen for 2 November 1993. In relation to earlier versions, the timetable presents an adjusted sequence of events and a clearer reciprocity of actions by the parties.

Thanks to all these developments, I feel the solution of the conflict may be approaching a turning-point. This makes it imperative for all - individual Governments as well as international organizations - to redouble their efforts to try to make the turning-point a reality.

In these circumstances, the adoption by the United Nations of a new document (Security Council resolution or statement by the President of the Security Council) on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict would represent a source of guidance and encouragement in the right direction, both for the parties to the conflict and for the rest of the Minsk Group.

Together with other members of the Group, I have reflected on some points which might usefully be included in this new document. I venture to pass them on to you. They are as follows:

- A confirmation of the earlier United Nations resolutions on the conflict;

- A call for a withdrawal from recently occupied territories, including the newly occupied territories;

- A welcoming of the direct contacts aimed in particular at establishing a stable and effective cease-fire, and a call to the parties to make the cease-fire permanent;

- An expression of support for the "Adjusted timetable" of 28 September 1993, and a call to the parties to the conflict to accept it;

- An underlining of the desirability of an early convening of the CSCE Minsk Conference, with a view to arriving at an overall settlement of the conflict, in conformity with the 24 March mandate of the CSCE Council of Ministers;

- An expression of readiness on the part of the United Nations to send its representatives to observe the Minsk Conference, if invited, and to provide all possible assistance for the substantive negotiations that will follow the opening of the Conference;

- An expression of support for the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE and of the willingness of the United Nations to be associated with it in any possible way;

- An expression of determination by the international community to help alleviate the human suffering caused by the conflict, in particular as concerns refugees and displaced persons, and human rights violations in general.

Appendix

[Original: English/Russian]

Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)

The following urgent steps will be implemented by the parties to the conflict. In the context of the timetable, the term "parties to the conflict" refers to the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan and to the leadership of Nagorny Karabakh, each according to its own role in the conflict. The Azeri interested party of Nagorny Karabakh will continue to have a role in the negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The terms "party to the conflict" and "leadership of Nagorny Karabakh" do not imply recognition of any diplomatic or political status under domestic or international law.

The parties to the conflict will continue to make all advance technical preparations, including by direct contacts between them, to ensure that the actions for which they are responsible can be accomplished according to the present timetable. They will coordinate closely with the head of the CSCE verification or monitoring missions as soon as he arrives in the region to demonstrate that all necessary preparations have been made.

Technical problems that may delay implementation of any step of the timetable will not affect the obligation of the parties to the conflict to carry out the subsequent steps of the timetable. The technical nature of such problems will be verified by the head of the CSCE verification or monitoring mission.

By signing the present timetable, the parties to the conflict confirm that they have agreed to continue to observe a complete and durable cease-fire at least until the opening of the Minsk Conference.

The parties to the conflict will, as soon as possible, exchange lists of all prisoners and hostages being held, whether by authorities or private persons, and all available information on persons who died in their custody. They will also exchange lists of missing persons, with a view to receiving all available information concerning their fate. The parties will immediately take all necessary action to facilitate access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to all prisoners and hostages.

In the present timetable, the term "withdrawal" is to be understood as withdrawal to the relevant segment of the 1988 district borders.

18-20 October - Minsk Group preparatory meeting for the opening session of the Minsk Conference.

23 October - Announcement by the Nagorny Karabakh leadership of readiness to withdraw from all recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan, and by all parties to the conflict that all obstacles to communications and transportation are removed and that a programme of restoration is under way.

- CSCE verification mission, led by a representative of the Chairman-in-Office accompanied by at least 15 to 20 experts and possibly by United Nations representatives, arrives in the region. As soon as possible after arrival, the head of the mission will set up a joint coordination commission along the lines set out in attachment II to the present appendix.

24 October - Withdrawal from the Kubatli district begins, including clearing of own mines.

25 October - The verification mission enters the Kubatli district, provided the head of mission is satisfied that the safety of the mission is ensured. Withdrawal from the Kubatli district is completed by 2359 local time.

26 October - The main gas pipeline from Azerbaijan into Armenia and Nakhichevan is reopened. This is verified by the verification mission.

- Withdrawal from the Agdam district begins, including clearing of own mines.

28 October - The verification mission enters the Agdam district, provided the head of mission is satisfied that the safety of the mission is ensured. Withdrawal from the Agdam district is completed by 2359 local time.

- The exchange of acknowledged hostages and prisoners of war is effected.

29 October - The Kazakh-Idjevan road is reopened from both sides. This is verified by the verification mission.

- Withdrawal from Fizuli begins, including clearing of own mines.

31 October - The verification mission enters the Fizuli district, provided the head of mission is satisfied that the safety of the mission is ensured. Withdrawal from the Fizuli district is completed by 2359 local time.

1 November - Reopening of the Kazakh-Idjevan railway from both sides. This is verified by the verification mission.

2 November - Opening session of the Minsk Conference (at the highest level among the parties to the conflict). Adoption of the agenda of the Conference.

- Signing by the parties to the conflict of a statement on the "Timetable of urgent steps", the continuation of the negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE and the continued implementation of Security Council resolutions

822 (1993) and 853 (1993). This statement will commit the parties to the irreversibility of the process.

- Solemn confirmation at the Conference of determination to ensure free and unimpeded access of international humanitarian relief efforts to the region, in particular in all areas affected by the conflict.

- Parties to the conflict commit themselves, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to return all hostages and prisoners of war or their remains, and to cooperate in accounting for the missing.

- Confirmation of the cease-fire, which is transformed into a permanent cessation of military activities. This term involves the exclusion, on a permanent basis, of:

  - The use of any type of weapon for military purposes, including shelling and aerial bombardments (complete cease-fire);

  - Any offensive operation or attack;

  - Any military manoeuvre;

  - Any movement of military units or military equipment and any transport for the purpose of resupplying of munitions to existing units or deploying reinforcements (except movements for withdrawal to the rear or reintroduction of lightly armed security personnel into the Kelbajar district, with prior notification to the relevant CSCE mission);

  - Any patrolling for either reconnaissance or combat purposes;

  - Any kidnapping or taking of hostages, plunder or killing of civilians.

Violations of the permanent cessation of military activities will be promptly reported by the relevant CSCE mission to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, along with a factual analysis, with a view to enabling the CSCE to take the appropriate measures, including the possibility of reporting violations and making recommendations to the Security Council.

Together with the announcement of the cessation of military activities, parties to the conflict should also state at the conference that, in the case of violations, they will punish those responsible on their own side.

4 November - End of the opening session of the Minsk Conference.

- Withdrawal from the Djebrail district begins at 0001 local time, including clearing of own mines.

6 November - CSCE verification mission enters the Djebrail district, provided the head of mission is satisfied that the safety of the mission is ensured. Withdrawal from this area is completed by 2359 local time.

- Announcement by the Government of the Azerbaijani Republic that "there will be restraint in the reintroduction of security personnel in the Kelbajar district". Such personnel will number approximately 1 per cent of the population having returned to the district and in any case will not exceed 500. Their weapons will be limited to pistols and sub-machine-guns/automatic rifles. A CSCE mission will monitor the level of security forces and the type of weapons to be reintroduced, in order to oversee that they correspond to the above provisions. These provisions shall apply until the Minsk Conference has completed its work or a subsequent regime of the district has been agreed.

7 November - The first elements of the CSCE monitor mission, comprising about 50 monitors, begin operating in the region on the basis of the terms of reference approved by the CSCE and of the present timetable.

- Withdrawal from the Kelbajar district begins at 0001 local time, including clearing of own mines.

9 November - CSCE verification mission completes verification of the withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Djebrail district.

10 November - Reopening of all remaining communications and transportation within the region.

12 November - Verification mission enters the Kelbajar district, provided the head of mission is satisfied that the safety of the mission is ensured. Withdrawal from the Kelbajar district is completed by 2359 local time.

13 November - Withdrawal from the Martakert district begins at 0001 local time, including clearing of own mines.

16 November - CSCE verification mission enters the Martakert district, provided the head of mission is satisfied that the safety of the mission is ensured. Withdrawal from this area is completed by 2359 local time.

18 November - CSCE verification mission completes verification of the withdrawal from the Martakert district.

28 September 1993

Attachment I

Definition of the area of conflict

The terms used in the present document do not imply recognition of any diplomatic or political status under domestic or international law.

The area of conflict includes the following:

A. All territory east of Armenia, south of the Georgian frontier and the southern bank of the Koura River and the Mingechaurskoe Reservoir and north of the northern bank of the Arax River, excluding the territory east of 48 longitude;

B. A strip of land having a width of about 5 kilometres on each side along the border between Armenia and the Azeri province of Nakhichevan;

C. A strip of land having a width of about 20 kilometres on the Armenian side of the remaining international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan;

D. Airfields, wherever located, under the control of the parties to the conflict at which combat or other aircraft used for military purposes can be based.

(See attached map of A, B and C areas and list of airfields)

Possible overlappings due to the application of the above criteria do not cause an increase in the area of conflict.

As an exception to the normal regime of the area of conflict, movements of unloaded weapons (including heavy weapons after reactivation) and personnel will be permitted, subject to prior notification to a CSCE mission of such reactivation and movement, in the city of Stepanakert, along the main road from Stepanakert north to Mardakert and south to Hadruth, and 1 kilometre on both sides of the road. Ammunition should be transported in separate convoys.

Normal border services or installations on borders with third countries shall be exempted from monitoring.

While monitors cannot be present in all locations at all times, they have the right to visit any part of the area of conflict at any time, for the accomplishment of their duties.

The monitoring area includes the area of conflict as defined in A to D above, as well as any other area on the territories under the control of the parties to the conflict as necessary for the monitoring mission to carry out the tasks specified in point 1 of the terms of reference.

Azerbaijan
RUSSIA
GEORGIA
ARMENIA
TURKEY
IRAN
20 km boundary
5 km boundary on either side of border
A
B
C
Derbent
Baku
Yerevan
Lake Urmia

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LIST OF AIRFIELDS

The following list of airfields has been prepared on the basis of the parties' contributions and remarks; the nature and condition of some of these airfields have to be ascertained. The definitive list of airfields to be monitored will be compiled by the head of the CSCE verification or monitoring mission as soon as the mission becomes operational.

Agdam	3958NO4700E	Lemkoran	3834NO4849E
Agjabedi*		Mets Mazra*	4011NO4546E
Akstafa	4107NO4525E	Naftalan	4031NO4649E
Baku-Bina	4028NO5023E	Nakhichevan	3911NO4527E
Baku-Kala	4024NO5012E	Nososnaya	4035NO4933E
Berd	4055EO4527E	Pirsagat	3951NO4920E
Bilasuvar (Pushkino)	3930NO4841E	Prishib	3951NO4920E
Dollyar	4053NO4557E	Sabirabad*	
Dzhermuk	3949NO4540E	Salyani	3938NO4859E
Fizuli	3935NO4711E	Samgachaly	4007NO4927E
Gajikabul*		Sheki	4108NO4709E
Geran*		Shinuayr	3927NO4620E
Goris*		Sisyan*	
Gyandzha	4044NO4619E	Sistal Chay	4048NO4925E
Gyoja*		Stepanakert	3954NO4647E
Kafan	3912NO4627E	Tamrukulular	4044NO4651E
Kala-Puta*		Tashir	4105NO441E
Karachala	3949NO4858E	Vardenis*	
Kazi Magomed	4001NO4854E	Yerevan (Yuzhnii)	4007NO4427E
Kumayri (Leninakan)	4045NO4351E	Yevlakh	4037NO4708E
Kyurtamir*		Zakataly	4133NO4640E
Kyzylagadzh	3900NO4848E	Zvartnots*	

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* Exact nature and condition to be ascertained.

Attachment II

Guidelines for a joint coordination commission

1. In order to facilitate the resolution of technical military issues and other technical issues arising from the day-by-day implementation of the timetable and other arrangements concluded during the peace process, a Joint Coordination Commission (JCC) shall be established in the monitoring area among all the parties to the conflict under the chairmanship of the head of the relevant CSCE mission and for the duration of that mission.

2. The purpose of the JCC shall be purely practical. Within the framework of its tasks, it will provide an opportunity for direct contacts between the parties. Its existence, composition and activities shall not imply recognition of any legal status of its parties under domestic or international law.

3. In the early stages of the process, the JCC shall contribute to ensuring an effective de-escalation and interruption of military activities, the identification of uncontrolled military formations and the continued observance of the cease-fire.

4. The JCC shall strive to improve the exchange of information among the parties, as well as the synchronization of actions by them.

5. The JCC shall be convened by its chairman on a regular basis, and whenever required. Items to be discussed will be determined by the chairman, taking due account of issues brought to his attention by any participant.

6. The JCC will be composed of the parties to the conflict. The representative of the Azeri community of Nagorny Karabakh shall participate in the discussion of those problems which concern that community directly.

7. The JCC shall normally meet at the relevant CSCE mission's headquarters. Its chairman may decide to convene it elsewhere in the monitoring area, whenever required.

8. The JCC proceedings and any conclusion on specific questions may be recorded under the chairman's responsibility.

9. Each party to the conflict shall facilitate all travel and activities relating to the JCC and ensure the security and safety of JCC participants in connection with such travels and activities, within the territory under its own control.

10. If necessary, the present guidelines may be reviewed by the Minsk Conference or its working groups.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26523
1 October 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

With reference to the two letters from the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation which were sent to you on 29 September and 1 October 1993 respectively, I should be grateful if you would have them circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Ahmed ELHOUDERI
Permanent Representative

93-53392 (E) 011093 011093

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ANNEX I

Letter dated 29 September 1993 from the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

I received your letter dated 24 September 1993 which contains replies to certain questions which were raised in the letter which we sent to you on 11 September 1993. I should like to express my appreciation to you for the speed and objectivity of your reply and for your recognition of our willingness to cooperate with you and to take positive and meaningful measures.

I should like to assure you once again of our determination to settle all pending issues with the countries concerned in order to improve our relations with all the countries of the world within a framework of dialogue, understanding and cooperation on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The replies contained in your letter concern the questions raised and the clarification requested by the lawyers of the two suspects but we are still awaiting the replies to the questions asked and clarification sought from the three Western countries.

We have sent to the lawyers of the two suspects the replies which you sent to us. For our part, we wish to say that the assurances you have given us are adequate and acceptable. As a State, and after these assurances, not only are we no longer opposed to the suspects going to trial, but we will encourage them to do so. We believe that there is only one more step which needs to be taken to resolve this crisis which has lasted for years, namely to convince the suspects, their families and their lawyers to go to trial. For our part, as we have already said, we will encourage them to do so.

As to the disaster of the UTA 772 aircraft, we assure you of our full willingness to cooperate with the competent French authorities, in accordance with the French demands in relation to the investigation of this incident.

(Signed) Omar Mustafa ALMUNTASSER
Secretary of the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and
International Cooperation

ANNEX II

Letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to the letter I addressed to you on 29 September 1993, I should like to confirm that the replies you gave to the questions raised by the two suspects are adequate and acceptable, and that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is encouraging the two suspects to appear before the Scottish courts.

As a token of our good will we are prepared to welcome a group of representatives from the Scottish courts to see the efforts we are making, to meet the two suspects, their families and lawyers and to contribute to the efforts designed to convince them to appear before the Scottish courts.

Furthermore, I wish to assure you that we will respond to the French requests with the same earnestness and determination we have shown with respect to the American and British requests.

I sincerely hope that the three countries will give some acknowledgement of our earnestness and our firm determination to implement Security Council resolution 731 (1992). I also hope that the countries concerned will help to create a favourable climate, devoid of any threat, ultimatum or escalation of the aggravation of sanctions, and that this will come about prior to the date scheduled for consideration of the action taken on resolution 748. In acting thus, these countries will be helping to bring us to the final stage of the long road we have travelled. There is no need to recall that we received answers to some of our questions on 28 September 1993 and that answers to the other questions would help to create this favourable climate.

(Signed) Omar Mustafa ALMUNTASSER
Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26524
2 October 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 19 to 26 September 1993, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi national airspace for the purpose of reconnaissance and provocation and the dropping of heat flares.

19 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 30 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Dukan and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 68 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurna, Busayyah and Artawi.

- At 1935 hours on 19 September 1993, a United States F-16 aircraft dropped 10 heat flares on the Salamiyah area north-east of Mosul.

20 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 10 sorties, flown at 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-7,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 54 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Basra, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah and Busayyah.

21 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Ayn Zalah, Zakho, Tall Afar, Dohuk and Amadiyah.

- At 1400 hours on 21 September 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Basra, Qurnah, Amarah and Jabayish. It departed at 1634 hours, heading in the direction of Saudi Arabian airspace.

22 September 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was recorded in the northern region on 22 September 1993.

(b) Southern region: 80 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,500-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Qurnah, southern Diwaniyah and Artawi.

23 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 48 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,500-10,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah and Qurnah.

24 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,500-8,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 70 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Shatrah, Samawah, Jalibah, Busayyah and Artawi.

- At 1246 hours on 24 September 1993, a hostile aircraft dropped five heat flares near the village of Badriyah north of Mosul.

25 September 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was recorded in the northern region on 25 September 1993.

(b) Southern region: 48 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Busayyah, Qurnah, Artawi and Jalibah.

- At 1425 hours on 25 September 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Basra, Qurnah, Maymunah and Jabayish. It departed at 1614 hours, heading in the direction of Kuwaiti airspace.

26 September 1993

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,500-8,000, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26525
1 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND
FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),

Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend UNPROFOR'S mandate for an additional period terminating on 5 October 1993;

2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

93-53379 (E) 011093

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26526
1 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

About 10 days ago, the Acting Zone Director of UNOSOM for north-west Somalia ("Somaliland") was told by the authorities that all United Nations personnel should withdraw from the region. Subsequently, on 28 September 1993, Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the "President" of "Somaliland" told the Acting Zone Director that his administration had set Wednesday, 29 September, as the deadline for the withdrawal of UNOSOM from the north-west. A message to that effect was communicated to my Special Representative for Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe. Mr. Egal also asked my Special Representative to inform him about the intention of the United Nations towards the region, both in the political and economic areas.

Despite the deadline of 29 September for UNOSOM's withdrawal from the north-west, Mr. Egal intimated that he could wait for a reply from the United Nations until 2 October 1993. On the evening of the original deadline, 29 September, the authorities in the north-west confirmed that UNOSOM must withdraw from the region by 2 October if no reply was received from the United Nations.

The Acting Zone Director has advised UNOSOM that he expected the security situation for United Nations personnel in the north-west to deteriorate if Mr. Egal did not receive a reply to his communication to my Special Representative. The United Nations Security Coordinator concurs with this assessment. In view of the security concerns and given the fact that the mandate of UNOSOM II is under Chapter VII of the Charter, I would like to seek the guidance of the Security Council on how to proceed on this matter.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26527
1 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have been apprised of the contents of your letter dated 1 October 1993 (S/26526) regarding the presence of UNOSOM II in north-west Somalia ("Somaliland").

The members of the Council express the hope that UNOSOM II will be able in due course to continue its work under its mandate in north-west Somalia ("Somaliland") using all peaceful means for the benefit of the population there.

The members of the Council are confident that you will take the necessary precautions for the safety and protection of all United Nations personnel deployed in north-west Somalia ("Somaliland").

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
President of the Security Council

93-53373 (E) 011093 011093

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26528
4 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the Declaration by the Chairman of the Parliament, Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, dated 2 October 1993.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this Declaration as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter P. CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26529
5 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 745 (1992)

1. In accordance with resolution 745 (1992), by which the Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), I have submitted a number of reports to the Council on the progress of the operation, as well as special reports required by the rapidly changing circumstances and unexpected developments in Cambodia. The latest of those reports (S/26360 of 26 August 1993) described developments since the elections successfully conducted in Cambodia by UNTAC in May 1993, the progress of the withdrawal of UNTAC military and civilian staff and preparations for the post-UNTAC period. On the basis of that report, the Security Council adopted resolution 860 (1993), by which, inter alia, it confirmed that UNTAC's functions under the Paris Agreements should end upon the creation in September 1993 of a new government of Cambodia consistent with those Agreements.

2. The mandate of UNTAC has now been accomplished in accordance with resolutions 745 (1992) and 860 (1993). On 19 September 1993, the 120-member Constituent Assembly which had been elected in May concluded its deliberations over a new Constitution. On 21 September 1993, the Assembly formally adopted the Constitution by a vote of 113 to 5 against, with 2 abstentions, a greater margin than the two-thirds majority specified in the Paris Agreements.

3. On 24 September 1993, His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State, formally promulgated the Constitution in Phnom Penh. Accordingly, Cambodia is now a constitutional monarchy with the official name "The Kingdom of Cambodia", and is an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned State. The same day, Prince Sihanouk was elected King of Cambodia by the Royal Council of the Throne. The powers and duties of the monarch are set forth in the Constitution in accordance with its article 7, which states that the King holds the throne but shall not hold power. In accordance with the Constitution and the Paris Agreements, the Constituent Assembly transformed itself into a legislative assembly.

4. The Constitution also stipulates that the Kingdom of Cambodia shall recognize and respect human rights in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all international instruments related to human rights and the rights of women and children. In accordance with article 51 of the Constitution, the Kingdom of Cambodia shall adopt a multi-party, free, democratic regime.

5. Following his election, King Sihanouk appointed His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Ranariddh, leader of the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) party, as First Prime Minister of Cambodia. FUNCINPEC won 58 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Mr. Hun Sen, leader of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which won 51 seats in the Assembly, was appointed Second Prime Minister.

6. Thus, the mandate entrusted to UNTAC was successfully concluded on 24 September 1993. My Special Representative for Cambodia left Cambodia on 26 September 1993.

7. The plan for the withdrawal of UNTAC personnel described in paragraphs 9 to 33 of my report of 16 July 1993 (S/26090) is proceeding smoothly. The Bulgarian, Tunisian, Uruguayan, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian battalions of the Military Component have now all left Cambodia and there is no longer an UNTAC presence in the seven eastern Provinces of Ratana Kiri, Mondol Kiri, Stung Treng, Kratie, Kompong Cham, Svay Rieng and Prey Veng. As at 30 September 1993, the Military Component stood at 9,373 all ranks. In accordance with Security Council resolution 860 (1993), the Military Component is scheduled to complete its withdrawal from the country by 15 November 1993.

8. Of the 3,600 members of the UNTAC Civilian Police Component deployed in Cambodia, only 28 headquarters officers remain in Phnom Penh as at 1 October, and they will be withdrawn on 1 October 1993.

9. The other civilian components of UNTAC have virtually completed their withdrawal. There now remains a team of administrative staff to finalize the withdrawal and disposal of UNTAC assets. I shall in due course present a final performance report to the General Assembly, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/209 B of 18 September 1993.

10. Meanwhile, action is in hand to establish the United Nations presence which is required in the post-UNTAC period to carry out a variety of functions to consolidate peace and stability in Cambodia. As indicated in my earlier reports (see also S/26090 of 16 July 1993), these include especially de-mining, economic rehabilitation and human rights.

11. It is with great satisfaction that I report to the Security Council the formation, on 24 September, of the new Government of Cambodia, based on the will of the people expressed through free and fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations. Thus, amid great hope and rejoicing, the central objectives of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict of 23 October 1991 (S/23177, annex) and of Security Council resolution 745 (1992) were realized and the transitional period came to an end.

12. As UNTAC now completes its mandate, I would like to express my appreciation to the members of the Security Council, both past and present, for their consistent support and guidance, without which our mission could not have been accomplished. I also wish to place on record my gratitude to the 46 countries which contributed troops and/or police officers, as well as my deep sorrow and regret at the loss of UNTAC personnel through hostile action, accidents and disease. I also pay tribute to His Majesty King Sihanouk, other leaders and the people of Cambodia for their historic achievement in overcoming more than

two decades of strife and devastation and laying a sound foundation for a peaceful and democratic Cambodia. It remains only to pay a tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, his Deputy Mr. Behrooz Sadry, the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, and to all the men and women of UNTAC for their steadfastness, hard word and devotion to the goals of the UNTAC mission and to the highest ideals of the United Nations.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26530
4 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of all peace-advocating Somalis, I wish to join you in expressing my sorrow at those brutal incidents that claimed the lives of United Nations peace-keepers, the latest of which resulted in the death of 12 American peace-keepers as well as 1 Malaysian peace-keeper and the injuries of dozens of peace-keepers on 3 October 1993. I wish to assure you, and the world, of our deepest regrets at this tragedy. Our condolences go to their families and friends and to the peoples and Governments of the United States of America and Malaysia.

Despite the obligation to start my letter with reference to those disturbing and unfortunate incidents in my country, I must not pass without extending my gratitude to you and the members of the Security Council for unanimously adopting your resolution 865 (1993). In this spirit, I wish to share with you and the members of the Council the contents of the attached few pages.

I should therefore be very grateful if this letter and its attachment could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fatun M. HASSAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

The challenges of the current reality in Somalia for the international community

Having expressed my deep sorrow at the death and injuries of the international peace-keepers, I also wish to express sorrow at the death of the hundreds of Somalis in Mogadishu during the latest as well as the previous senseless fights with the international forces, and I wish that those tragedies could have been avoided. I deplore those premeditated incidents of violence which exposed the lives of innocent civilians (including women and children) to such dangerous and fatal circumstances in pursuit of self-imposed ends. I appeal to the hearts and minds of my countrymen and women in the south of Mogadishu to maintain order and let reason prevail. I also plead with the leadership of the Somali National Alliance (SNA)/United Somali Congress (USC) to revert to their better senses and resort to civilized ways for resolving national problems and expressing their grievances. After all, the SNA/USC has been a party to the Addis Ababa agreements of 27 March 1993, which endorsed, and indeed coincided with, the approval of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) by the Security Council.

I must remind the world of the fact that the international community has a responsibility towards attaining peace and stability in present-day lawless Somalia. UNOSOM II is acting in accordance with its approved mandate under this international responsibility. We are indeed very grateful that Somalia has become relatively more peaceful and more stable, except in that part of Mogadishu which has, of late, remained the trouble spot and a stumbling-block in an otherwise improving situation with international support and assistance. Any withdrawal of the international forces or change in their mandate and rules of engagement will be detrimental to peace in the whole country and will bring the situation back to where it started.

The world must not forget the following facts. There are a minimum of 12 other factions that are signatories to the Addis Ababa agreements of 8 January and 27 March, that are supportive of the United Nations efforts (including disarming) and that are patiently waiting but closely observing the results of the SNA/USC antagonism. The fact that all the other factions are not directly involved in the prevailing situation does not mean that they will always remain satisfied with the course of events. It may, and can happen, God forbid, that there will be future clashes of interest of other factions with the position of the United Nations.

General Aideed and his immediate followers come from outside Mogadishu, the central regions, 500 kilometres away. In a country that has socially, politically and geographically disintegrated into its component clans, his influence in the area is equated with that of an occupation force, by some. This constitutes one of the main reasons for the feud between his faction and the other in the north of Mogadishu. Under normal circumstances, SNA/USC's influence in the area would not have been a problem, but given the prevailing mentality of intense clan-consciousness in today's Somalia, the fact that General Aideed and his followers come from outside Mogadishu will definitely invite a new wave of inter-clan fighting if the United Nations fails to enforce

the Addis Ababa agreements. This gives all the more reason for re-enforcing the current course of action to disarm all of the Somali factions instead of pulling out some of the troops. The facts have inherited, and share between them, a sizeable amount of the military equipment of the Somali armed forces, considered at one point the best equipped in Africa.

If the current discourse on the Somali question leads to a premature withdrawal of troops or a softening of the international will and zest to enforce the Addis Ababa agreements, it will have consequences for peace in Somalia; it will undermine the credibility of the United Nations to enforce peace and security throughout the world in a most turbulent era of its existence; and it will fail the positive hopes and aspirations internationally linked to a better new world order. Therefore, if the adversaries or the sceptics of the United Nations Operation in Somalia are truly concerned about the affliction of international peace-keepers or the Somalis themselves - if at all - I forewarn them of the consequences of their tenet which will inevitably claim the lives of an infinite number of Somalis and will result in incalculable losses in material and moral terms as well as irreversible costs to regional peace and stability.

Ideally, there should be no reason for the international community to negotiate unilaterally with the SNA/USC. Instead, the faction has to concentrate on sorting out its differences with other Somali factions - if at all - which has been the point of the international mediation efforts towards reconciliation. I would therefore encourage the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to explore the possibility of holding an immediate consultative Somali national conference involving all factions, ensuring the participation of legitimate SNA/USC negotiators, to discuss the present situation. I would, however, warn against the international community contemplating the formation of a government, as a quick-fix and as an easy way out of the current isolated crisis in the south of Mogadishu, at this stage, which can be counter-productive given the prevailing political psychology.

In any case, the formation of a national representative government is premature given the reality in south Mogadishu and the claimed secession of the north by the Somali National Movement (SNM), in addition to the fact that there are outstanding territorial kinship-right claims to many population centres considered to be regional capitals. All these, and many more constitutional and political problems, preclude the possibility of an immediately constituted government prior to their solution. Reconciliation should take account of the real issues and problems at district and provincial levels and should therefore be multi-level, not entirely focused on empty political differences between faction leaders. Those efforts directed towards the creation of civil structures at local levels and peacemaking initiatives between clans in major population centres have been steps in the right direction. I firmly believe that UNOSOM should continue with its assistance towards the creation of civil structures at district levels as an avenue towards established regional or provincial authorities which will naturally and eventually lead to a representative national government.

For months, people in Somalia have been anxious to see the benefits of the programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction and remained concerned about the concentration of international efforts and resources in Mogadishu, and

particularly its south. While I do appreciate the reasons for this to date, I believe it is about time that the United Nations and the international non-governmental organizations boost their presence in other parts of the country for re-enforcing peace and revitalizing the civil society so that the world could appreciate the stark contrast of these other parts with south Mogadishu. I must also qualify this assumption by noting the fact that international voluntary contributions towards rehabilitation and reconstruction, in support of UNOSOM, have not been encouraging to date.

Nevertheless, we are grateful for whatever contributions have already been made or pledged. But I wish to remind the world that Somalia has been supported by the international community, even during the previous tyrannical regime. Somalia would still need assistance even if there were a government in place today, and will continue to obtain international assistance long after its reconstruction as a State. This fact is notwithstanding the growing international complacency and impatience with current assistance at a most miserable stage of the country's history. Effectively managed, today's assistance can lead to quicker reconstruction, which might offset or reduce the future burden of the international community. Renewed international commitment to voluntary contributions necessary for rehabilitation and reconstruction seems to be the shortest cut to a solution and the probable way out of future resource implications.

The Somali question sets a new and an important precedent for international peace-keeping. In this regard, the Security Council, and particularly the five permanent members, are primarily accountable. Ironically, Somalia has succeeded in disintegrating itself in search for democracy, justice and freedom within itself. It is true that it has presented a challenging question to the rest of the world; but let us hope that the question does not lead to confusion in the existing world order in the international community's search for solutions to the crisis. Indeed, any turning back from current efforts at this stage can be detrimental to peace in Somalia and can frustrate similar or future international solidarity on peace and stability.

I claim neither the legitimacy nor the moral authority to impose my wishes on the international community as regards what to do or how to approach the Somali question. But I grant myself a moral obligation to submit my humble and true convictions, and fears, putting forward what I consider to be the collective Somali interest first, and to offset any courses of action which might become detrimental to the international goodwill to maintain world peace and stability and pose a predicament to the dependent Somali future.
I therefore only hope that the international community will remain consistent in its efforts to maintain peace and stability in Somalia, with its intentions and formal decisions in support of its internationally adopted laws, its declared principles of justice and human rights and the binding Somali agreements.

I therefore plead with the members of the Security Council, all the States Members of the United Nations and all the regional groups and intergovernmental organizations to maintain their support to the current mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia to avoid a greater loss and a lasting tragedy.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26530*
4 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of all peace-advocating Somalis, I wish to join you in expressing my sorrow at those brutal incidents that claimed the lives of United Nations peace-keepers, the latest of which resulted in the death of 12 American peace-keepers as well as 1 Malaysian peace-keeper and the injuries of dozens of peace-keepers on 3 October 1993. I wish to assure you, and the world, of our deepest regrets at this tragedy. Our condolences go to their families and friends and to the peoples and Governments of the United States of America and Malaysia.

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I should therefore be very grateful if this letter and its attachment could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fatun M. HASSAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

The challenges of the current reality in Somalia for the international community

Having expressed my deep sorrow at the death and injuries of the international peace-keepers, I also wish to express sorrow at the death of the hundreds of Somalis in Mogadishu during the latest as well as the previous senseless fights with the international forces, and I wish that those tragedies could have been avoided. I deplore those premeditated incidents of violence which exposed the lives of innocent civilians (including women and children) to such dangerous and fatal circumstances in pursuit of self-imposed ends. I appeal to the hearts and minds of my countrymen and women in the south of Mogadishu to maintain order and let reason prevail. I also plead with the leadership of the Somali National Alliance (SNA)/United Somali Congress (USC) to revert to their better senses and resort to civilized ways for resolving national problems and expressing their grievances. After all, the SNA/USC has been a party to the Addis Ababa agreements of 27 March 1993, which endorsed, and indeed coincided with, the approval of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) by the Security Council.

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26531
5 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3287th meeting of the Security Council, held on 5 October 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "The situation in Cambodia", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the members:

"On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I wish to thank His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Ranariddh, First Prime Minister, and His Excellency Mr. Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister, of the Royal Government of Cambodia for their presence here and to express the satisfaction of the Security Council at the auspicious developments that have taken place in Cambodia since the holding of the elections of 23 to 28 May 1993, in particular the proclamation of the Cambodian Constitution on 24 September 1993 and the creation of the new government of Cambodia.

"I also take this opportunity to congratulate His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, on his accession to the throne and to pay tribute to the continuing role played by His Majesty in the quest for national reconciliation and a better future for all Cambodia.

"In the light of the successful completion of the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the Security Council reiterates its recognition at the remarkable work carried out by UNTAC, under the leadership of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi.

"The Security Council stresses the importance of the continued support of the international community to the consolidation of peace and democracy and the promotion of development in Cambodia.

"Taking into account the letter dated 26 September 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Ranariddh, First Prime Minister, and His Excellency Mr. Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister, and the further report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 745 (1992) which members of the Council have just received, the Council will continue to study the situation in Cambodia and will consider what action it should take."

93-54045 (E) 051093

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26532
5 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 866 (1993) of 22 September 1993, by which the Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).

Following the usual consultations, it is my intention to appoint Major-General Daniel Ishmael Opande of Kenya as the Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOMIL.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

93-54069 (E) 051093

051093

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26533
5 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 27 September 1993 (S/26532) concerning the appointment of the Chief Military Observer (CMO) of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
President of the Security Council

93-54075 (E) 051093

051093

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26534
6 October 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 5 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the French and English texts of the statement on Cambodia issued by the European Community and its member States on 30 September 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of
Belgium to the United Nations

93-54159 (E) 061093 061093

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on Cambodia issued on 30 September 1993

The Community and its member States welcome the adoption of a new constitution by Cambodia and express the hope that this constitution will provide a solid basis for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Cambodia. They congratulate His Majesty Prince Sihanouk on his appointment as constitutional monarch and express the hope that the process of national reconciliation will continue to make progress under his authority.

The next step towards achieving that goal, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris agreements, is to form a new Government after transforming the constituent Assembly into a legislative Assembly. The Community and its member States congratulate His Royal Highness Prince Ranariddh and His Excellency Mr. Hun Sen on their appointment as first and second Prime Ministers.

The Community and its member States reaffirm their desire to continue support for the rebuilding of Cambodia in cooperation with the new Cambodian Government, with the aim of consolidating the peace process embarked on pursuant to the Paris agreements, and would urge the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to rejoin the peace process by agreeing to open up the areas which it controls to the regular forces of the legitimate Government of Cambodia in order to ensure the unity of the country in accordance with the second Paris agreement guaranteeing the neutrality, unity and integrity of Cambodian territory.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26535
6 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 867 of 23 September 1993 by which the Council decided to establish a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

Having completed consultations, I propose that the military component of UNMIH be composed of contingents from the following Member States: Argentina, Canada, United States of America.

I also propose that the following States contribute to the police component: Algeria, Austria, Canada, France, Madagascar, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, Venezuela.

All of these States have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available.

I am awaiting replies from certain other States which have been informally approached and will revert to the Security Council when I have an indication of whether they are also ready in principle to contribute personnel to this mission.

I should be grateful to you if you would bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

93-54223 (E) 061093

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26536
6 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 5 October 1993 (S/26535) concerning the military and police components of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposals contained in your letter.

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
President of the Security Council

93-54229 (E) 061093

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